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REVITALIZING ROSENBLOOM: THE MATTER
OF PUBLIC CONCERN STANDARD
IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET
AMY KRISTIN SANDERS*
HOLLY MILLER**
Across the nation, health professionals, including plastic
surgeons, medical spa doctors and dentists, have come under fire from
their own patients, who are taking to the Internet to air their complaints.
But many of these doctors are not sitting idly while their reputations are
tarnished. Instead, they are fighting back by using defamation law. As
doctors increasingly file "online patient review" defamation suits, courts
are faced with determining whether the doctor has a high enough profile
in the community to be deemed a public figure, a characterization that
would force the doctor to prove actual malice-a standard more stringent
than what a non-public figure would be held to.
One of the most talked about cases involved Tiffany Craig, an
Oregon resident, who wrote in a 2011 blog post that local med spa doctor
Jerrold "Jerry" Darm was reprimanded for demanding sex from a patient
in exchange for treatment, and that he was required to have a chaperone
present when examining female patients.I Craig's blog failed to mention
that the 10-year-old order was lifted in 2009.2 Craig tweeted about the
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1. Sally Ho, Oregon's First Twitter Libel Lawsuit Pits Tigard Doctor Against
Portland Blogger, THE OREGONIAN (Oct. 11, 2011, 9:19 AM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/tigard/index.ssf/2011/l0/oregons first twitter libel la.h
tml.
2. Id.
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blog entry as well.3 In July 2011, Darm sued Craig for defamation, which
garnered significant attention from both the media and legal scholars.4
Although the case settled in late 2011, Craig had argued that Darm was a
prominent local doctor who amounted to a public figure, requiring him to
prove actual malice-knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the
truth-to succeed.' She also argued the case involved a matter of public
interest, while Darm argued it was not a matter of public interest.6 Before
the case settled, an Oregon district court judge ruled the issue was a
matter of public interest and that Twitter was a public forum, but the
judge did not address whether the plaintiff was a public figure.'
As use of social media and the Internet grows, studies suggest
the number of defamation cases is increasing as well.' Bloggers are being
sued for defamation in courts across the world.9 Although U.S. courts
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Doctor Lawsuits Over Online Review by Patients
(Or Their Family Members) [Updated July 2013], SANTA CLARA LAW DIGITAL
COMMONS, (July 15, 2013), http://digitalcommons.1aw.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1 289&context-historical.
5. Ho, supra note 1; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974) ("Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor
and success with which they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as
public figures and those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to
reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.").
6. Ho, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. A 2011 study by the legal information firm Sweet and Maxwell found that
the number of defamation cases in England and Wales doubled in the first half of
2011. Further, it revealed that the number of cases involving celebrities were down,
meaning more average citizens are heading into court. Although most of the
evidence supporting an increase in defamation filings in U.S. courts is merely
anecdotal, the concern is real given the Internet's international reach and the U.K.'s
plaintiff-friendly approach to defamation law. See Kelsey Blair, Social Media
Causes Rise in Defamation Cases, SOCIALTIMES (Aug. 30, 2011, 11:40 AM),
http://socialtimes.com/social-media-causes-rise-in-defamation-cases b76365;
Lauren Dugan, Twitter Defamation Cases Are Heating Up, MEDIABIsTRO (Aug. 17,
2011, 3:15 PM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alitwitter/twitter-defamation-cases-
are-heating-up b12799.
9. Take, for example, a recent case involving U.S. golfer Phil Mickelson, who
is suing for defamation in a Quebec court after an anonymous Internet user posted
statements about him and his wife online. Mickelson is suing the Internet Service
Provider to obtain the identity of the anonymous blogger. See, e.g., Phil Mickelson
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have a long history of deciding defamation cases since the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 0 online
defamation cases further complicate the tumultuous past of the
constitutional defamation doctrine. Under the current approach that
began with Sullivan in 1964, courts categorize plaintiffs into two
categories-public plaintiffs, or private plaintiffs-to determine the
burden of proof the plaintiff must satisfy. Public figure plaintiffs are
required to show actual malice (a higher degree of fault) while private
figure plaintiffs can often succeed by proving a lesser standard of fault
(often negligence) with some limitations." Fifty years after Sullivan, is
this practice of deciding whether someone is a public figure or a private
figure still workable? Should appearing in a popular blog post, infamous
Tweet, or well-known viral video, turn a person into a public figure for
defamation purposes?
Historically, U.S. courts have favored a strong level of First
Amendment protection for traditional media defendants, like The New
York Times, who are involved in defamation cases. Yet, as citizen
journalism and blogging become more prevalent as a means of mass
communication, is it still viable for courts to distinguish between media
and nonmedia defendants in defamation cases? Based on current case
law,12 the courts would likely consider most health professionals to be
private figures and most amateur bloggers to be nonmedia defendants.
Under such a scenario, the plaintiff would likely be required to show
only that blogger was negligent in posting the information if the court did
Suing Over Internet Postings, THE TORONTO STAR (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.thestar.com/sports/golf/2012/02/02/philmickelson suing overinternet
postings.html. Or, consider the 2009 flap involving blogger Rosemary Port, who
was outed after anonymously labeling model Liskula Cohen as a "ho" and "skank."
See, e.g., George Rush, Outed Blogger Rosemary Port Blames Model Liskula Cohen
for Skank' Stink, N.Y. DAILY NEWS.COM (Aug. 23, 2009, 7:44 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/outed-blogger-rosemary-port-
blames-model-liskula-cohen-skank-stink-article-1.400409.
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
12. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see generally
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
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not believe the subject was a matter of public concern.13 The Darm
case-and others like itl4 -raise important questions about the viability
of the public/private figure distinction in the Internet age, and suggest
that returning to the matter of public concern inquiry may provide more
protection for core First Amendment speech. Justice Brennan noted in
Sullivan that:
To persuade others to his own point of view, the
pleader, as we know, at times resorts to
exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been,
or are, prominent in church or state, and even to
false statement. But the people of this nation have
ordained, in the light of history, that, in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened
opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens
of a democracy.
To protect as much core First Amendment speech as possible,
this Article argues that courts should abandon the public/private figure
distinction developed in Sullivan because that standard is no longer
workable for defamation cases arising in the Internet age.16 Part I begins
with an overview of major U.S. defamation jurisprudence and the various
13. Courts often use the terms "matter of public concern" and "matter of public
interest" interchangeably, and as a result, both are used to represent the same
concept within this article.
14. See, e.g., Moore v. Hoff, 821 N.W.2d 591(Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (finding
that a former employee failed to establish a cause of action for tortious interference
based upon a blogger's publishing true statement about the former employee).
15. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
310 (1940)).
16. To examine all relevant case law, the authors conducted a search of both
federal and state cases in the Westlaw database using the search queries "Internet /p
defamation," "online /p defamation" and "blog /p defamation." In addition,
landmark defamation cases, including New York Times v. Sullivan, Curtis Publ'g v.
Butts and Gertz, were Shepardized to find additional cases for review. This analysis
does not attempt to document each and every instance of defamation involving the
Internet and social media. Instead, it attempts to illustrate the difficulties the Internet




standards the Supreme Court has mandated. Next, Part II turns to a
review of scholarly work on the state of defamation law, which illustrates
a consensus among scholars that the courts should clarify the role of the
plaintiffs status. Scholars, however, disagree about how courts should
go about offering guidance-with some supporting the public/private
figure distinction, and others suggesting a return to the matter of public
interest model. Marshaling the scholarly evidence along with legal
precedent, Part II concludes that courts should re-think the system of
plaintiff classification initiated by Sullivan and, instead, focus on
whether the alleged defamatory speech involves a matter of public
concern. Further, Part III proposes that courts should require all
plaintiffs-regardless of public or private status-to prove actual malice
in defamation cases involving speech on matters of public concern
because it offers more protection for core First Amendment speech,
harmonizes the application of defamation law to media and nonmedia
defendants, and creates a standard that can be implemented by the
judiciary.
I. THE COURTS, DEFAMATION LAW, AND STANDARDS OF PROOF
At common law, the defamation tort was a relatively simple, pro-
plaintiff tort. Since the Supreme Court's Sullivan decision, the legal
landscape has grown increasingly complex. 17 In the decades following
Sullivan, the Court has ruled on cases that introduced both fault and
falsity elements, re-shaping the tort to provide more protection for
speech. However, the intricacies of Internet communication necessitate a
re-assessment of the elements of defamation to strike a more desirable
balance between the protection of an individual's reputation and the
facilitation of public discourse.
A. Holding Public Figures to a Higher Standard
In Sullivan, the Court held for the first time that the First
Amendment's free speech protections limit a defendant's liability for the
17. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
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publication of alleged defamatory speech." L.B. Sullivan, the
Montgomery, Alabama police commissioner, claimed the New York
Times defamed him by publishing an advertisement seeking financial
support for the civil rights movement.1 9 The Court held that public
officials could only recover damages in a libel lawsuit if they proved that
the defamatory statements were published with actual malice-
knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth:20
[W]e consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.21
Justice Brennan's statement draws attention to the nature of the
speech as a part of a topic of national importance-a sentiment that lays
the groundwork for his later reliance on the matter of public concern
standard in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.22 For example, he noted that
"[t]he present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest
on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to
qualify for the constitutional protection." 23
In the same year, the Court extended the Sullivan actual malice
24
rule to criminal defamation cases in Garrison v. Louisiana. Three years
later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,25 the Court extended Sullivan's
18. Id. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.").
19. Id. at 256-57.
20. Id. at 283.
21. Id. at 270.
22. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
23. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
24. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (applying the Sullivan actual
malice rule in a criminal libel action against a nonmedia defendant whose alleged
defamatory statement was made at a press conference).
25. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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rationale to public figures by ruling that, like public officials, they must
26
meet a heightened fault standard to succeed in defamation claims.
While the Court disagreed as to a specific heightened standard for public
figure libel plaintiffs, five justices advocated for a standard at least as
strict as actual malice.27 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren
noted that public figures were not significantly different from public
officials in their role in shaping society, and therefore held that there was
a strong public interest in their actions and activities.28 In requiring a
higher standard of proof for public officials and public figures, Chief
Justice Warren noted the significance of public figures' access to the
mass media "both to influence policy and to counter criticisms of their
views and activities."29 Based on its decisions in Sullivan and Curtis
Publishing, the Court established a distinction between public figures
and private figures, leaving lower courts with the task of determining on
a case-by-case basis which plaintiffs amounted to public figures, who
would then have to prove actual malice.
26. Id. at 154-55. Butts was a companion case to Associated Press v. Walker,
388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court held that the plaintiffs in both cases were public
figures. Id. Wally Butts was the athletic director at the University of Georgia, and
Edwin Walker was a well-known ex-military officer. Id. at 135, 139.
27. Id. at 155, 162, 170-72. The plurality opinion authored by Justice Harlan
argued for a standard higher than negligence but lower than actual malice. Id. at 155.
Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice White all agreed that actual malice was
the correct standard, and Justice Black and Justice Douglas held that the press should
be exempt from any libel suits involving public officials or public figures. Id. at 162,
170-72.
28. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
29. Id.
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B. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia and the Matter ofPublic Concern
Standard
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,31 a plurality of the Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Brennan, shifted the inquiry away from
evaluating a plaintiffs status and ruled that all defamation cases
involving speech on matters of public concern required the plaintiff to
prove the Sullivan actual malice standard.32 The petitioner, George
33Rosenbloom, was a distributor of nudist magazines. Local authorities
arrested him, seized his books and magazines, and charged him with
selling obscene material.34 The state court judge found that as a matter of
law, the publications were not obscene, which led to the jury rendering a
verdict in Rosenbloom's favor. 3 5 After the conclusion of the trial,
Rosenbloom sued a radio station that had characterized the publications
he sold as "obscene" and referred to him as a "smut distributor []" and
14 36"girlie-book peddler []" during its coverage of the arrest and trial.
Writing in favor of Metromedia, Justice Brennan opined that the
"determinant whether the First Amendment applies to state libel actions
is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of public or general
concern, albeit leaving the delineation of the reach of that term to future
cases." 3 7 Brennan suggested that "public or general concern" be
construed broadly enough to include speech related to government,
38
science, morality, and the arts. In the plurality opinion, Brennan also
30. Courts and scholars have used various terms to describe this standard.
Court opinions and literature refer to this standard as the "public-concern test," the
"public-interest test," the "matter of legitimate public interest or concern standard,"
and other variations of similar construction. Accord, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
, -, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011). For purposes of consistency and clarity, the
test established in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971), and referred to in
subsequent court opinions will be referred to in this article as the "matter of public
concern standard," unless a different version appears in a quotation.
31. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971), abrogated by Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
32. Id. at 31-32.
33. Id. at 32.
34. Id. at 32-33.
35. Id. at 36.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 44-45.
38. Id. at 42-44.
536 [Vol. 12
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reflected on the previous standard of classifying plaintiffs that had
developed in Sullivan and its progeny. He wrote:
Further reflection over the years since New York
Times was decided persuades us that the view of
the "public official" or "public figure" as assuming
the risk of defamation by voluntarily thrusting
himself into the public eye bears little relationship
either to the values protected by the First
Amendment or to the nature of our society. . . .
Voluntarily or not, we are all "public" men to some
degree. Conversely, some aspects of the lives of
even the most public men fall outside the area of
39matters of public or general concern.
Justice Brennan acknowledged the plaintiffs reputational and
privacy interests.4 0 However, the societal interests of free speech and free
press as protected by the First Amendment led Brennan to rule that the
relatively low standard of reasonable care (i.e. negligence) was a
constitutionally inappropriate standard for defamatory speech related to
matters of public concern. 41 Justice Brennan relied on past precedent to
conclude that it was imperative to protect the publication of truthful
affairs, which also means sometimes having to protect some erroneous
publications as well.42
But just three years later, the Court retreated from its holding in
Rosenbloom in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.43 The case arose out of a
magazine article accusing Elmer Gertz, an attorney, of participating in
the trial of a Chicago policeman as a part of a Communist conspiracy to
discredit local law enforcement." Gertz sued for libel.4 5 In its decision,
the Court rejected the Rosenbloom plurality's matter of public concern
39. Id. at 47-48 (citation omitted).
40. Id. 48-49.
41. Id at 48-51.
42. Id. at 51-52.
43. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
44. Id. at 325-326.
45. Id. at 327.
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46
standard. The majority held that when a plaintiff in a defamation case is
a private figure, each individual state may establish the appropriate
standard of fault-so long as it is not strict liability.47 The Court held
Gertz was a private figure, and that he should not have to be bound by
the actual malice rule articulated in Sullivan.48
After Gertz, the plaintiffs status as a public or private figure
once again became relevant in evaluating what standard of proof should
be applied in defamation cases. Accordingly, states can permit the mere
showing of negligence by the publisher of a defamatory falsehood-even
if the speech deals with a matter of public concern. The Court gave two
reasons for this standard: (1) to promote the state's legitimate interest in
allowing a private figure to protect his good name, 4 9 and (2) to avoid
having state and federal judges "decide on an ad hoc basis which
publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do
not."o The Court also held that a private figure in a defamation action
may not recover presumed or punitive damages from a defendant unless
the plaintiff can show the defendant acted with actual malice." The
Court's critique of the matter of public concern indicated Gertz was
meant to abolish the standard permanently, but the matter of public
concern concept surfaced again in two later defamation decisions along
with a host of other cases dealing with the First Amendment. 52
46. Id. at 345-46.
47. Id. at 347.
48. Id. at 352.
49. Id. at 345.
50. Id. at 346.
51. Id.
52. See generally Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)
(holding that in order to protect the free flow of ideas and opinions on matter of
public concern, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures and
public officials from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress without additionally showing a false statement of fact made with
actual malice); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(noting that while the public interest is advanced by individual privacy, in the case of
the reporter-informer relationship, it is in society's interest to create conditions in
which information possessed by news sources can reach public attention); Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (holding Westboro Baptist Church's speech is a




C. Some States Reject Gertz, Stand By Rosenbloom
Courts in Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, New Jersey, and New York
have resisted the invitation from the U.S. Supreme Court in Gertz to
deviate from the Sullivan actual malice standard. None of them has
adopted a lower fault standard when the plaintiff is a private figure.
Instead, each state's high court has adopted some form of the
Rosenbloom matter of public concern standard, requiring that plaintiffs
prove actual malice when the alleged defamatory speech involves a
matter of public concern. 3
In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Colorado recognized in its opinion that there is "no perfect rule to be
promulgated which will balance the conflict between the First
Amendment right of the press and the injury sustained by a person
defamed, more particularly when that person is a Private individual
involved in a subject of public or general concern."55 In defense of its use
of the Rosenbloom matter of the public concern standard, the court said:
53. See, e.g., Mount Juneau Enter. v. Juneau Empire, 891 P.2d 829 (Alaska
1995) (holding that plaintiffs are required to prove actual malice on issues of public
interests and concern, even if the plaintiff is a private figure); Walker v. Colo.
Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975) (en banc), overruled on other grounds
by Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982)
(holding that when a defamatory statement has been published concerning a private
individual, but involves a matter of public or general concern, the plaintiff is
required to prove actual malice); Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido's, Inc., 712 N.E.2d
446 (Ind. 1999) (holding that the actual malice standard of proof is required in
defamation cases involving matters of public or general concern regardless of the
status of the plaintiff); Sisler v. Gannett Co., 516 A.2d 1083, 1093 (N.J. 1986)
(holding that "[t]he negligence standard ... is inappropriate in the context of a
defamation action that focuses upon published matters of legitimate public concern .
. ."); Chapandeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 341 N.E.2d 569 (N.Y. 1975) (holding
that when the content of a news article is "of legitimate public concern[,]" the
plaintiff must "establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted
in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of
information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible
parties").
54. Walker, 538 P.2d 450.
55. Id. at 457-58.
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Our ruling here results simply from our conclusion
that a simple negligence rule would cast such a
chilling effect upon the news media that it would
print insufficient facts in order to protect itself
against libel actions; and that this insufficiency
would be more harmful to the public interest than
the possibility of lack of adequate compensation to
a defamation-injured private individual.5 6
In refuting the argument that the matter of public concern
standard is too difficult to apply, the Colorado Supreme Court reasoned
that determining what constitutes a matter of public concern, while
seemingly difficult, would be a matter of law left up to experienced
judges, rather than a question of fact, which may present difficulties for
. . 57
juries.
In Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc. , the Indiana Court of Appeals for the Third District
expressed a similar sentiment:
The general or public interest test for applying the
'malice' privilege standard will involve the trial
courts in the task of deciding what information is
or is not relevant to the promotion of free
expression. While it is true that this task will not
always be easy, the courts have traditionally
assumed the role of ultimate arbiters of disputes
concerning conflicting constitutional policies. The
contention that the judiciary will prove inadequate
for such a role would be more persuasive were it
not for the sizable body of federal and state cases
that have employed the concept of a matter of
general or public interest to reach decisions in libel
cases involving private citizens. The public interest
56. Id. at 458.
57. Id. at 459.
58. Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Nw. Publ'n., Inc., 321 N.E.2d
580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
540 [Vol. 12
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is necessarily broad; recent decisions dealing with
a panoply of topics and events, ranging from
organized crime to the quality of food served in a
particular restaurant, will assist trial courts in
defining the proper scope of the public interest
test. 9
Although states like Colorado and Indiana have continued to
apply the Rosenbloom standard instead of following the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Gertz, the Court revisited the matter of public concern
standard in two new contexts.
D. Reviving The Matter ofPublic Concern Standard: Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss, Inc. and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps
Twelve years after Gertz, the Court limited the second part of its
holding in Gertz with Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss, Inc.,so and
revisited the matter of public concern standard as it applies to the
defamation tort. Defendant Dun & Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency,
sent a report to five of its subscribers that wrongly stated that plaintiff
Greenmoss Builders, a construction contractor, filed for bankruptcy.61
The Court upheld a Vermont court's award of presumed and punitive
damages to Greenmoss Builders on a showing of less than actual
62malice. The plurality reasoned that Gertz's limitation on punitive and
presumed damages was inapplicable to the case because the speech did
not involve matters of public concern, and therefore, was of "less First
Amendment concern." 63 In balancing the interest of a private individual's
right to protect his reputation with the First Amendment interest in
protecting free speech, a plurality of the Court concluded that when
speech is not a matter of public concern, it should receive less
64constitutional protection. After Dun & Bradstreet, lower courts dealing
with private figures once again have to consider whether the speech at
59. Id. at 590.
60. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
61. Id. at 751.
62. Id at 763.
63. Id. at 759.
64. Id.
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issue deals with a matter of public concern when the plaintiff seeks
presumed and punitive damages.
One year later, the Court made the matter of public concern
standard relevant again in yet another context. In Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,65 the Court held that the First Amendment
requires that defamation plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the
defamatory statement is false when the speech addresses a matter of
66
public concern. Maurice Hepps, the plaintiff, was a private figure and
the principal stockholder of a corporation that owned a chain of
67
convenience stores. The defendant newspaper printed a series of stories
linking the company to organized crime and improper influence of the
state government.6 The Court found the speech touched on a matter of
public concern and, therefore, Hepps had the burden of proving the
69
speech was false. The Court reasoned that state laws that place the
burden on media defendants to prove truth threaten to chill speech on
matters of public concern by causing the media to fear liability even as a
result of publishing true speech.70 Although it appeared Gertz put an end
to the matter of public concern standard, the Court re-introduced this
analysis in Hepps and Dun & Bradstreet, despite its earlier criticisms that
the standard was too difficult for courts to apply. Since deciding this
series of cases from the 1980s, the Court has not revisited the issue.
1I. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE STATE OF DEFAMATION LAW
Many scholars agree that current defamation standards are
confusing, often contradictory, and offer little predictability for parties.
Because of these issues, scholars have called for the Court to revisit
defamation law to provide new clarity and consistency to an old legal
doctrine. 7 1 First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla has argued that too
65. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
66. Id. at 779.
67. Id. at 767.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 778.
70. Id. at 777.
71. Rodney Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American
Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1983) (calling the conflicting defamation
doctrines "unacceptable").
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much focus has been given to the purported clash between speech and
reputation, and that "not enough energy has been devoted to the more
technical tasks of straightening out" defamation rules so they "stand a
72
chance" of balancing the competing interests of speech and reputation.
However, scholars are divided on how the Court should deal
with the mess of defamation law. Some scholars align with the Court's
decision in Gertz and argue against using the matter of public concern
standard in defamation analysis.73 For example, law professor Arlen
Langvardt concluded that defamation law would be better served without
the matter of public concern standard because of the lack of guidance
that the Court has given lower courts as to how to apply it.74 Law
professor Nat Stern agreed with Langvardt's criticisms of the matter of
public concern standard and called the standard "so vague and
subjective, courts can (and often do) arrive in good faith at opposite
characterizations of essentially similar expression. Refining the
standard would be worthwhile to Stern if it had been originally
76
demanded by "doctrinal necessity," but he concluded it was not. He
recommended the Court return to the original understanding of Gertz,
requiring a private figure to prove actual malice for special damages
72. Id. at 63.
73. See, e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Rule For
An Old Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 241
(1986) (arguing the Court should reinstate the original understanding of Gertz
because of the Court's lack of guidance on how to apply the matter of public concern
standard); David W. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REV. 199 (1976) (concluding Gertz's
plaintiff categorization method is a compromise between the interests of free speech
and an individual's reputation and lays out a more stable standard than the matter of
public concern standard); Nat Stern, Private Concerns of Private Plaintiffs: Revising
A Problematic Defamation Category, 65 Mo. L. REV. 597 (2000) (arguing the public
concern standard is "vague and subjective" and that Dun & Bradstreet contradicts
the Court's holding in Gertz); Stephen J. Mattingly, Note, Drawing a Dangerous
Line: Why the Public-Concern Test in Constitutional Law of Defamation is Harmful
to the First Amendment, and What Courts Should Do About It, 47 LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 739 (2009) (advocating that use of the public concern test is a threat to the First
Amendment, as government officials would be deciding what constitutes matters
worthy of being debated).
74. Langvardt, supra note 73, at 270.
75. Stern, supra note 73, at 653.
7 6. Id.
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rather than muddy the waters with the standard set forth in Dun &
Bradstreet, which requires courts to distinguish whether the speech at
issue involves a matter of public concern.7 7 Stern argued "the cost in
deterred speech from the unpredictable public concern test is literally
incalculable. Whatever the cost, however, it outweighs the negligible
benefit of an unworkable standard." Law professor Cynthia Estlund
argued the matter of public concern standard has actually lessened the
protection of speech, despite its appearance of being more speech
protective.7 9 Estlund reasoned that:
The public concern test rests on an unduly
constricted vision of public discourse. It
undermines the capacity of the citizenry to bring
hitherto "private" and particularized grievances
onto the public agenda, and it inevitably leads to
the suppression and the deterrence of speech that is
important to public debate. These serious flaws are
inherent in the nature of the public concern test,
and would similarly plague any content-based
category of privileged or disfavored speech that
assigned the function of explicitly sorting out
"speech that matters" from speech that doesn't.80
Estlund called on the Court to seek out different doctrinal tools
that do not require courts to determine what is or is not a public issue
worthy of debate.
Yet other scholars argue the matter of public concern standard is
viable, making it the preferred option over the categorization of
82
plaintiffs. Law professor Gerald Ashdown recognized that although
77. Id.
78. Id. at 653.
79. Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters ofPublic Concern: The Perils ofAn
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); see also
Mattingly, supra note 71.
80. Id. at 55.
81. Id. at 55.
82. See, e.g., David Lat & Zach Shemtob, Public Figurehood in the Digital
Age, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 403 (2011) (rendering Gertz's plaintiff
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scholars and lawyers would like distinguishable jurisprudential
categories, sorting out public officials, the various categories of public
figures, and private individuals does not leave "the kind of breathing
space a healthy notion of free expression can tolerate." Ashdown
argued that libel analysis should be focused on the subject matter
discussed rather than the character or notoriety of the individuals
involved in a defamation action. 84
Based on this, Ashdown concluded the Rosenbloom decision was
"the more sensitive and sensible approach" to libel cases versus Gertz's
messy categorical approach that distinguishes between public and private
figures.85 Even with a narrow view of the First Amendment, Ashdown
made the case that limiting fully protected discussion to matters
concerning public policy or governmental operations would provide
more "constitutional consistency and integrity" and be consistent with
traditional First Amendment values.86 He argued that:
Although the Rosenbloom public interest analysis
provides greater breathing space for free
expression, courts should at least recognize the
constitutional need for New York Times protection
for the discussion of public policy matters.
Evidently, this confusion over the necessary scope
of a subject matter approach has led some courts to
adopt a negligence standard for defamatory
categorization standard obsolete with such profound changes to the media landscape
and advent of digital media); Gerald Ashdown, Of Public Figures and Public
Interest - The Libel Law Conundrum, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937 (1984) (arguing
plaintiff categorization is unworkable and that the public concern standard is a more
sensible approach); R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and
Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27 (1987) (acknowledging the public concern standard
comes with difficulties but concludes it is preferred over a more convenient
standard); Robert E. Drechsel, Defining "Public Concern" in Defamation Cases
Since Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1990)
(identifying ways the Court can ascertain what type of speech should be classified as
a matter of public concern).
83. Ashdown, supra note 82, at 951.
84. Id.
8 5. Id.
86. Id. at 951-52.
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publications about private individuals without
solicitude for first amendment values.87
Ashland emphasized the need to require defamation plaintiffs to
prove actual malice whenever the subject matter of the publication
pertains to a matter of public concem-even if the plaintiff would
otherwise be considered a private figure.88
Law professor R. George Wright conceded that determining
what types of speech pertain to a matter of public concern can be
difficult, but he pointed out that some of the most challenging problems
in legal analysis involve difficult and amorphous concepts that are
essential to the adjudication of cases.89 Wright advocated for standards
that increase the consistency and predictability of the application of the
matter of public concern standard instead of rejecting it in favor of a
standard "more convenient" and "less controversial" that does not
directly address fundamental free speech concerns like robust public
debate. 90 Wright argued assigning speech to broad categories like
"economic" or "commercial" to determine whether the topic is a matter
of public concern is an ineffective approach.91 For example, Wright
explained a president's budgetary decisions may be a matter of public
92concern, while an individual's financial situation may not be. He
concluded courts must scrutinize the speech at issue, but that the standard
can be applied in defamation actions without evaluating plaintiff status.9 3
Scholars are also specifically beginning to recognize the
94
problems current defamation doctrine presents in the digital age. For
87. Id. at 955-56.
88. Id. at 954.
89. Wright, supra note 80, at 28.
90. Id. at 30. Contra Lat & Shemtob, supra note 82 (arguing the plaintiff
categorization method is more difficult to apply in the age of the Internet).
91. Wright, supra note 82, at 38..
92. Id.
93. Id
94. See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation &
Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000) (discussing the trend of "John
Doe" defamation suits where corporations bring suits against an unknown individual
for allegedly libelous statements made about them on the Internet); Thomas D.
Brooks, Note, Catching Jellyfish in the Internet: The Public-Figure Doctrine and
Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 461
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example, law professor Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky studied the trend of "John
Doe" defamation lawsuits where corporations and their officers bring the
suit against an unknown individual for allegedly libelous statements
95made about them on the Internet. Lidsky noted these lawsuits are
generally not about collecting damages, but are usually brought for
symbolic reasons, some of which she believed are worthy while others
are not.96 Although some Internet users are held accountable for their
speech as a result of these lawsuits, the suits also threaten legitimate
criticism. Lidsky argued that existing legal doctrines are not responsive
to the threats posed to public discourse via the Internet.
Lidsky's research discussed the new realm of discourse that got
its start online. "The promise of the Internet is empowerment: it
empowers ordinary individuals with limited financial resources to
'publish' their views on matters of public concern." 97 Lidsky
characterized the Internet as a "powerful tool for equalizing imbalances
of power by giving voice to the disenfranchised and by allowing more
democratic participation in public discourse," thus helping everyday
individuals shape public policy.98 At the same time, Lidsky is not naive
to the fact that the Internet can also have real effects on an individual's
reputation with its ability to spread messages widely, quickly, and in a
repetitive manner.99 The problem for libel law, Lidsky noted, is figuring
out a way to balance protecting an individual's reputation without
diminishing the Internet as a place for public discourse.' 00 "Although
commentators and the Supreme Court have been preoccupied principally
with the chilling effect of defamation law on the mass media, chilling-
effect arguments have particular resonance in cases involving
'nonmedia' defendants like those typically sued in the new Internet libel
cases., ,1o The problem, Lidsky concluded, is that these lawsuits threaten
to suppress legitimate critical speech online along with regulating
(1995) (identifying potential problems that could arise in applying the public figure
standard in the age of the Internet).
95. Lidsky, supra note 94, at 858-60.
96. Id. at 859.
97. Id at 859.
98. Id at 860.
99. Id. at 864.
100. Id at 864.
101. Id. at 888-89.
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intentional falsehoods.102 Lidsky argued current defamation doctrines are
no fit for cyberspace.10 3
In 1995, then-law student Thomas Brooks identified three
potential problems that could arise in applying the "public figure"
standards in the age of the Internet.104 Brooks argued three elements of
public figure classification would become crucial in defining public
figures in online defamation suits based off of courts' application of
Sullivan: (1) whether the plaintiff had access to the media; (2) whether
there was a public controversy; and (3) to what degree the plaintiff
injected himself into this controversy.105 Brooks argued that the diversity
of Internet news groups and bulletin boards made the question of access
crucial to online defamation cases. o0 Access remains a critical question
as today's websites focus more on user engagement and participation.
The modern Internet user traded in early forms of bulletin boards for
social networking websites like Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedln and
interactive websites like Pinterest (where users can link to their favorite
ideas and images online). Early Internet newsgroups have transformed
into online-only news publications like The Huffington Post, or local
news hubs like Patch.com, where users can contribute content and
comments. Just as it was in 1995, individuals may not be subscribers or
have access to all platforms and, therefore, may not have the ability or
opportunity to reply to the allegedly defamatory statement. 07 Without
access to the particular medium, courts may find the plaintiff to be a
private figure, thus allowing a lower standard of proof than "actual
malice." 08
However, Brooks notes that courts may also recognize how easy
it is to respond on many of these forums and conclude the plaintiff had
sufficient access to the media to be classified as a public figure. 09 He
pointed out that many comment forums and bulletin boards eliminate
intermediate editors that plaintiffs would have to go through to respond
102. Id. at 888.
103. Id.
104. Brooks, supra note 94, at 461.
105. Id. at 462.
106. Id. at 479-80.
107. Id. at 482.
108. Id. at 489.
109. Id. at 482.
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via the traditional media." 0 In terms of classifying whether the matter is
a public concern, based on Supreme Court precedent, Brooks concluded
in 1995 that any messages posted on online bulletin boards or news
groups would not likely be deemed a public concern and work in the
favor of plaintiffs. Finally, Brooks purported it may be easier to argue
that a plaintiff has asserted himself into a controversy online because
courts have often been willing to find this when the plaintiff has engaged
in the use of advertising, which is much easier online. 112 Brooks
hypothesized in 1995 that plaintiffs involved in online defamation cases
would less likely be classified as public figures, although he believed it
might become more likely in cases involving commercial users.
Defendants utilizing online forums, he believed, may routinely be held to
a negligence standard in libel cases as opposed to the actual malice
standard.14
David Lat, the founder and managing editor of the legal website
Above the Law, and Zach Shemtob, an assistant professor in criminal
justice and criminology, argued that "profound changes to the media
landscape have rendered Gertz obsolete" as a standard for analyzing
defamation lawsuits. 15 Lat and Shemtob critiqued Gertz's ability to
address who is a public figure in the age of the "microcelebrity."I 16 The
authors presented the idea that instead of a world with a few well-known
celebrities (also known to the courts as all-purpose public figures) and
millions of "nobodies" (known to the courts as private figures), digital
media has created a world of "minor celebrities," including reality TV
stars and prominent bloggers." 7 The Internet, they argued, has
fragmented our culture into "microcultures" that produce "niche
celebrities" known to small groups of people. Based upon these
changes in the media, Lat and Shemtob proposed returning to the
110. Id.
111. Id. at 485.
112. Id. at 488.
113. Id. at 489-90.
114. See id.
115. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 82, at 403-04.
116. Id. at 413 (citing CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF
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Rosenbloom rule and applying the actual malice standard in cases
involving matters of public concern. They stated:
[T]echnology has eroded privacy in so many
different ways. As Justice Brennan declared in
Rosenbloom, "[v]oluntarily or not, we are all
'public' men to some degree . . . . In this day and
age-of blogs, where our private misadventures
can be written about at length; of streaming video
and YouTube, where said misadventures can be
seen and heard by total strangers; of Facebook,
where "friends" can post pictures of us, against our
will (maybe we can "de-tag," but we can't
remove); of full-body scanners at the airport-
Justice Brennan's words ring more true than ever,
for better or worse. We are more "public" and more
interconnected than ever.l19
The authors believed the Rosenbloom matter of public concern
standard can overcome criticisms of creating a regime that would be "too
favorable" to defendants. 120 The authors pointed to Colorado, Alaska,
Indiana, New Jersey, and New York, who already employ standards
similar to Rosenbloom in state courts. 12 1 They also argued "Rosenbloom
results in a more favorable regime for publishers and speakers, [and] it
simply reflects the law evolving to accommodate advances in
communications technology."1 22 According to Lat and Shemtob applying
old defamation rules to new media represents a poor public policy
decision, as "[i]t would prevent society from reaping the full rewards of
new communications technologies by inhibiting speech."l 2 3
119. Id. at 415-16.
120. Id. at 416.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 416-17.
123. Id. at 417.
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR REQUIRING PROOF OF ACTUAL MALICE WHEN THE
DEFAMATORY SPEECH INVOLVES A MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN
A. The Internet and the Nature of Modern Defamation Jurisprudence
In Reno v. ACLU, 24 an early case where the Supreme Court
considered regulation of the Internet, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote:
[The Internet] provides relatively unlimited, low-
cost capacity for communication of all kinds. The
Government estimates that "[a]s many as 40
million people use the Internet today, and that
figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999."
This dynamic, multifaceted category of
communication includes not only traditional print
and news services, but also audio, video, and still
images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue.
Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a
phone line can become a town crier with a voice
that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox.125
Justice Stevens christened the Internet as the "new marketplace
of ideas," and wrote that as a matter of constitutional tradition, the Court
must "presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is
more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage
it.126 The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic
society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship."27
Just as it was in 1997, Justice Stevens' cautionary advice about
regulating the Internet continues to be relevant in a number of areas of
law that threaten to chill speech online-including the Court's inaction in
addressing conflicting defamation doctrines related to plaintiff status.
124. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
125. Id. at 870.
126. Id. at 885.
127. Id.
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A return to the Rosenbloom matter of public concern standard
provides a greater uniformity across defamation law, which is defined
individually at the state level in compliance with the constitutional
mandates. By abandoning the plaintiff status distinctions in favor of the
matter of public concern standard, the courts would provide more
consistent protection to core First Amendment speech regardless of the
status of the person who was spoken about. In the digital age, where
speakers and audiences are often separated by vast geographic distances,
this standard could harmonize the law across states. Whereas Alaska,
Colorado, Indiana, New Jersey and New York alone require all plaintiffs
to prove actual malice, under the Rosenbloom matter of public concern
standard, all plaintiffs in all fifty states would have to prove actual
malice to recover in defamation cases involving matters of public
concern. Such a uniform standard prevents the type of forum-shopping
that often occurs in Internet defamation cases, where plaintiffs who have
been defamed online search for jurisdictions with the most pro-plaintiff
standards to file suit. Re-instituting the Rosenbloom standard levels the
playing field for all Internet speakers by preventing plaintiffs from
seeking out a plaintiff-friendly forum and then attempting to argue the
website was targeted to the particular venue. Given courts' uncertain
history in addressing choice of law, community, and other issues related
to Internet defamation,128 a return of the Rosenbloom standard provides
defendants with much-needed harmonization in an area where the law is
murky at best.
If the Supreme Court were to re-institute Rosenbloom in a
fashion similar to Colorado, it would further add predictability to the law
by removing from the jury the often-difficult question of whether the
plaintiff is a public or private figure. Instead, as Colorado notes, the
question of whether the speech addresses a matter of public concern is a
question of law for the judge to decide 29-an inquiry the legal system
128. See generally Amy Kristin Sanders, Defining Defamation: Community in
the Age of the Internet. 15 COMM. L. & POL'Y 231 (2010) (examining the definition
of community in defamation lawsuits by comparing factors used by courts to define
community in print and broadcast defamation cases with those used in Internet
defamation cases).
129. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d, 450, 459 (Colo. 1975)
("We rule that [the determination that a matter is of public interest or concern] is a
question of law for the court.").
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undertakes in a variety of cases. Just as certain plaintiffs (take golfer
Tiger Woods, for example) are quite clearly public figures, some topics
(take a community leader's purported involvement in a widespread
mortgage scandal)130 are quite clearly matters of public concern.
Predictability of the law in this area serves a greater function
than simply helping attorneys and plaintiffs evaluate the merits of their
case; it provides both media and nonmedia speakers with the ability to
better decide when and what to publish. '3 As the journalism industry
transitions from an institutional press model into a model that relies on
participatory journalism, it is even more important that we protect speech
on matters of public concern-and encourage all speakers to share
information that citizens need to make informed decisions.
Substituting the Rosenbloom matter of public concern standard
in place of plaintiff status determinations is almost certain to expedite
defamation claims by streamlining the legal process. As mentioned
above, a number of defamation cases, those paralleling the Dun &
Bradstreet and Hepps line of cases, already require some evaluation of
whether the subject involved is a matter of public concern. Thus, in these
types of cases, the return of the Rosenbloom standard would eliminate
the additional evaluation necessary to determine plaintiff status. Such a
streamlining of the process should be particularly welcome by judges
working in an already-overburdened legal system. Additionally, judges
presiding in U.S. courts frequently make determinations about whether
issues are a matter of public concern when adjudicating invasion of
privacy cases where newsworthiness is raised as a defense.132
Supreme Court Justices and scholars have been concerned that
the public concern standard would be difficult to apply. However, in an
examination of fifty-seven lower court decisions, Professor Robert
Drechsel demonstrated some consistency among courts in their
130. See Moore v. Hoff, 821 N.W.2d 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (concerning
the public controversy surrounding a blogger's statement that was deemed non-
defamatory).
131. Drechsel, supra note 82, at 20 (arguing the media-nonmedia distinction
appears to be used to avoid otherwise difficult subjective decisions about the content
and importance of speech, but that this ultimately leaves the mass media more
protected and private individuals more vulnerable).
132. See id at 15 ("[I]n at least three-fourths of the 'public concern' cases, the
allegedly defamatory material was either provided to or disseminated by the mass
media.").
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determination of which speech constitutes a matter of public concern and
which does not.133 Drechsel's analysis showed speech about "politics and
campaigns; operations of financial institutions; conduct of government
and public officials; illegal or questionable business practices with
ramifications for the general public; public health and safety; criminality
and criminal justice; recruitment methods of religious cults;
pornography; and athletics" are often deemed matters of public
concern.134 Matters not of public concern are:
[speech involving] employers' allegations of
wrongdoing by employees or customers without
ramifications for the general public; personal
disputes between businesses and disgruntled
customers; job recommendations; intra-
professional disputes; intra- or inter-organizational
business without ramifications for the general
public; a paternity claim; a recommendation or
tenure at a state university; inaccurate credit
reports; and aspersions made in commercial
advertising.'
With some established categories already in place and
successfully utilized by some courts, other courts could make a smooth
transition to evaluating defamation cases based on matters of public
concern.
The courts of the five U.S. states mentioned above 3 6 are not
alone in evaluating whether a matter is of public concern. It seems the
notion of public concern is playing a larger jurisprudential role across the
globe. In Argentina, for example, "[t]he public interest standard as 'an
exemption from punishment' is one of the most significant legal
developments" in the attempts to decriminalize defamation.m Canadian
133. Id. at 10-14.
134. Id. at 12-13.
135. Id. at 13-14.
136. See supra Part L.C.
137. CHARLES J. GLASSER JR., INTERNATIONAL LIBEL AND PRIVACY
HANDBOOK: A GLOBAL REFERENCE FOR JOURNALISTS, PUBLISHERS, WEBMASTERS
AND ATTORNEYS 8 (3d ed. 2013).
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courts have recently recognized "the value of protecting statements even
when they cannot be proven true" by allowing the defense of "public
interest responsible communication," wherein the courts must determine
if the speech involved matters of public concern. Similarly, Australia
allows a public interest defense "where the material published discusses
government or political matters and publication of the material was
reasonable in the circumstances."' 39
Finally, the very nature of the Internet makes the Gertz approach
to categorizing public figures even more untenable. It seems as notions
of privacy fade and the voyeur culture1 4 0 continues to thrive, the
exceptions to the Gertz rule-the limited-purpose and involuntary public
figures-threaten to overtake the rule that protects private figures under
the current system. As a society, do we really believe that a college
student videotaped singing in her dorm room becomes a public figure-
required to prove actual malice-simply because the doctored video her
roommate posted to YouTube goes viral? It hardly seems that this is the
type of speech that Alexander Mieklejohn envisioned the First
Amendment protecting when he wrote about self-governance.141
Determining when a plaintiff rises to the level of a limited-purpose
public figure-or even worse, an involuntary public figure-will only
get more difficult as the Internet further fuels our "microcelebrity"
culture. Although society's notion of who constitutes a public figure may
be changing (making these inquiries particularly dicey given that they are
often jury questions) it seems we might find a bit more stability in the
topics that judges are willing to consider as matters of public concern.
After all, it is hard to imagine a situation in which our singing college
student video would constitute a matter of public concern.
138. Id. at 42.
139. Id. at 136.
140. See generally CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND
PEERING IN MODERN CULTURE, 2 (2000) (discussing the issues surrounding
"mediated voyeurism," which is defined as "the consumption of revealing images of
and information about others' apparently real and unguarded lives, often yet not
always for purposes of entertainment but frequently at the expense of privacy and
discourse, through the means of the mass media and Internet").
141. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing democracy cannot reach its essential ideal if those in
power can withhold criticism and stifle the free flow of information and democratic
ideas).
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B. A Proposal for a Three-Part Evaluation When It Is Not Apparent That
the Subject Matter Is ofPublic Concern
In situations where it is not readily apparent to a court that the
speech involves a matter of public concern-social or political speech-
the authors propose that courts use a common-sense, holistic evaluation
that includes some of the factors that Drechsel noticed courts are already
employing.142 First, courts should look at the medium used to
disseminate the defamation. Speech that is a matter of public concern is
more likely to have been distributed through a mass medium or well-
known/frequently-used Internet platform. 143 Second, courts should
consider the status of the plaintiff within the context of the situation.
Finally, courts should examine the subject matter of the speech and
consider whether it is of public interest or merely of interest to the
public.145 Matters of public concern should inform the audience of some
good or harm or other concern of the community. 14 6 With courts already
having to make these determinations under Dun & Bradstreet and Hepps,
it is only logical that it becomes the standard for defamation when new
technologies have made the plaintiff status determinations more difficult.
CONCLUSION
The law will never be all things to all parties, but harmonization
of state laws in light of the international reach of the Internet provides a
solid start at providing the type of predictable outcomes that plaintiffs
and attorneys desire: predictable outcomes that media and nonmedia
defendants require to serve the historic function of providing the public
with the information necessary to make important decisions related to
self-governance in a democracy. No standard is perfect, but the
142. Drechsel supra note 82, at 14-18.
143. Id. at 14-15.
144. See id.
145. See Brian Cathcart, Is there any Difference Between the Public Interest
and the Interest of the Public?, THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR RESPONSIBLE
MEDIA BLOG (Aug. 10, 2011), http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2011/10/08/is-there-is-
any-difference-between-the-public-interest-and-the-interest-of-the-public-brian-
cathcart/ (concluding the public can also have interest in a story of public interest,
but the distinction frames how to initially think about the issue at play).
146. Id.
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Rosenbloom standard continues to haunt defamation jurisprudence
through its progeny in Dun & Bradstreet and Hepps, both of which
require the courts to traverse the sticky wicket that many legal scholars
believe the matter of public concern standard to be. Replacing the
plaintiff status inquiry with a matter of public concern standard simply
acknowledges this challenge and brings it to the forefront-placing the
onus on judges to do what they routinely do: Make tough legal decisions
after examining the relevant law in conjunction with the fact pattern
presented. It seems this approach is no more ad hoc than requiring a jury
to figure out whether someone is a limited-purpose public figure, and if
so, whether the defamatory statement concerns the purpose for which the
plaintiff has become a public figure. In the law, there are few easy
answers and many tough questions; this Article simply suggests
streamlining the process to eliminate one of those tough questions-
whether a plaintiff is a public figure-by relying more readily on the
answer to a second tough question-whether the matter is of public
concern-that is already a required piece of the defamation equation.
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